 131. Quantum Physics (Living Light) |
THE CERTAINTY PRINCIPLE
The “uncertainty principle”, upon which much of modern scientific theorizing depends, is proposed on the basis of the circumspect observation that it is not possible to simultaneously observe (and, thus, to “know”) both the speed and the “location” of a “particle” of light (or energy).
On the basis of this observation relative to the intrinsic limitations of any observing “point of view”, modern scientific theorizing has developed complex analytical and mathematical tools of measurement (especially in the subatomic and quantum domain) that presume that light (or energy)— and, thus, the “universe itself”—is, itself, a paradoxical domain (or even a domain of multiple and parallel universes). As a consequence of such theorizing relative to the process of measurement, probability and possibility (rather than certainty) has become the context of both theory and measurement in the field of subatomic and quantum physics.
Whatever the conventional merits of such science may be, it must be understood that to “know” the speed and “location” of a “particle” (or anything else) is relevant only to “point of view” (or the would-be “knower” that is attention itself, “self-located” in time and space as a psycho-physically defined ego-“I”).
That is to say, the “uncertainty principle” applies to “point of view” (or any space-time-“located” observer)—but that does not indicate that Reality Itself can rightly be characterized by either the limitations or the presumed “knowledge” of “point of view” (or of the space-time-“located” observer) itself.
To “know” the spatial “location” of a “particle”, the observing “point of view” must disregard its own process (of motion and change) in time—and, thus, in that instant, it cannot observe (because it does not assume either the position or the disposition to observe) the speed (or the time-process) of the any “particle”. That is to say, only a “point of view” that is presumed to be “located” in and as a definite and specific (or fixed and unchanging) spatial “place” can, with certainty, predict or “know” the definite and specific “location” of a thereby observed “particle” (or anything else). Indeed, it may rightly be said that the presumed spatial “locatedness” of the “point of view” (or the observer) determines (or, by and with reference to itself, “causes”) the definite and specific “location” of the “particle” (or the whatever)—which is even to say that spatial “location” is, itself, a physical (or body-“self”) illusion (or, at best, a merely perspectival artifice, with reference to the always temporary and reductive, and, thus, illusory, presumption of a spatially fixed “point of view”).
To “know” the speed (or motion, or change, in time) of a “particle”, the observing “point of view” must disregard its own “location” in space—and, thus, in that instant, it cannot observe (because it does not assume either the position or the disposition to observe) the spatial “location” of the “particle”. That is to say, only a “point of view” that is presumed to be “located” (and moving and changing) in time (and not merely fixed in a definite and specific spatial “location”) can, with certainty, measure or “know” the speed of motion and change of a thereby observed “particle” (or anything else). Indeed, it may rightly be said that “self”-identification with the time-based characteristic (of motion and change) by the observing “point of view” (and its consequent “self”-forgetting relative to the noticing of its own presumption of fixed spatial “locatedness”) determines (or, by and with reference to itself, “causes”) the apparent speed of the motion and change (or even the fact of the motion and change) of the “particle” (or the whatever)—which is even to say that the speed, the motion itself, and the appearance of change observed in any instance is, itself, a mental (or mind- “self”) illusion (or, at best, a merely historical, or time-based, artifice, with reference to the always temporary and reductive, and, thus, illusory, presumption of a time-defined, and, thus, time-bound, “point of view”).
In other words, the observability (or “knowability”) of factors of either space or time depends on the orientation (or “self”-presumed “self”-characteristic) of the observing “point of view”—which cannot be both a space-oriented spatial identity and a time-oriented temporal identity (or both a thoroughly physical “self” and a thoroughly mental “self”) in the same instant.
