 169. Time & Space |
Three distances AB1, BC1, CA1 may, if CA1 be suitably chosen, have their marks BB1, CC1, AA1 superposed on one another in such a way that a triangle ABC results. The distance CA1 has an upper limit for which this construction is still just possible. The points A, (BB') and C then lie in a "straight line" (definition). This leads to the concepts: producing a distance by an amount equal to itself; dividing a distance into equal parts; expressing a distance in terms of a number by means of a measuring-rod (definition of the space-interval between two points).
When the concept of the interval between two points or the length of a distance has been gained in this way we require only the following axiom (Pythagoras' theorem) in order to arrive at Euclidean geometry analytically.
To every point of space (body of reference) three numbers (co-ordinates) x, y, z may be assigned--and conversely--in such a way that for each pair of points A (x1, y1, z1) and B (x2, y2, z2) the theorem holds:
measure-number
AB = {sqroot (x2 - x1)2 + (y2 - y1)2 + (z2 - z1)2}
All further concepts and propositions of Euclidean geometry can then be built up purely logically on this basis, in particular also the propositions about the straight line and the plane.
These remarks are not, of course, intended to replace the strictly axiomatic construction of Euclidean geometry. We merely wish to indicate plausibly how all conceptions of geometry may be traced back to that of distance. We might equally well have epitomised the whole basis of Euclidean geometry in the last theorem above. The relation to the foundations of experience would then be finished by means of a supplementary theorem.
The co-ordinate may and must be chosen so that two pairs of points separated by equal intervals, as calculated by the help of Pythagoras' theorem, may be made to coincide with one and the same suitably chosen distance (on a solid).
The concepts and propositions of Euclidean geometry may be derived from Pythagoras' proposition without the introduction of rigid bodies; but these concepts and propositions would not then have contents that could be tested. They are not "true" propositions but only logically correct propositions of purely formal content.
Difficulties.--A serious difficulty is encountered in the above represented interpretation of geometry in that the rigid body of experience does not correspond exactly with the geometrical body. In stating this I am thinking less of the fact that there are no absolutely definite marks than that temperature, pressure and other circumstances modify the laws relating to position. It is also to be recollected that the structural constituents of matter (such as atom and electron, q. v.) assumed by physics are not in principle commensurate with rigid bodies, but that nevertheless the concepts of geometry are applied to them and to their parts. For this reason consistent thinkers have been disinclined to allow real contents of facts (reale Tatsachenbestände) to correspond to geometry alone. They considered it preferable to allow the content of experience (Erfahrungsbestände) to correspond to geometry and physics conjointly.
This view is certainly less open to attack than the one represented above; as opposed to the atomic theory it is the only one that can be consistently carried through. Nevertheless, in the opinion of the author it would not be advisable to give up the first view, from which geometry derives its origin. This connection is essentially founded on the belief that the ideal rigid body is an abstraction that is well rooted in the laws of nature.
